If you are interested in works like Philip Tetlock, you should look into Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. He also has a wikipedia page.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Bueno_de_Mesquita
Here are some URLs about his works:
(as of Fri, Jun 18, 2021 the pages are [UP])
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-t.html
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120201554
https://web.archive.org/web/20150930072215/http://magazine.good.is/articles/the-new-nostradamus
If you watch Bueno de Mesquita video below, he will tell you, that his method is based on game theory, that the method can be taught, that it is based on negotiation and manipulation (to influence the decision-maker), that it only works on people who are rational and are self-interest. A two-year-old is not rational.
Using game theory to model complex decision-making
1:42:42
The Predictioneer's Game
42:47 (start)
https://youtu.be/XfE0ih-6fi8?t=2567
https://youtu.be/XfE0ih-6fi8?t=2567
44:00 (stop)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfE0ih-6fi8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfE0ih-6fi8
NYUAD Institute
Published on Sep 15, 2015
The Predictioneer's Game
December 9, 2009
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita will discuss how applied game theory can be used to anticipate policy choices whether in business or in government.
The Predictioneer's Game
https://slideplayer.com/slide/4437069/
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[backgrounder: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita]
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: Stories of Research to Reality
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUPEUZy3UX8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUPEUZy3UX8
17:34
sage publishing
May 14, 2015
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155084/Theory%20Talk31_BuenodeMesquita.pdf
Course taught by Donald Stokes. I read and prepared an oral presentation on William Riker’s Theory of Political Coalitions for that course and discovered that the strategic principle in that book was incorrectly derived. This was my first exposure to formal modeling and the first time that I saw how rigorous logic (a formal model in this case) could be used to conclude that a claim was false, not as a matter of opinion but as a matter of straightforward logic.
Finally, the chair of my Ph.D. committee ─ Richard L. Park ─ had a deep influence on my thinking and my approach to teaching. He demonstrated a tolerance for a perspective different from his own that I found inspiring. Dick Park was one of the founders of modern South Asian studies. He found my rational choice and quantitative approach to Indian politics rather different from his own thinking but he encourage me, supported me, and nurtured the confidence that allowed me to go forward despite resistance from many other leading lights in the South Asia research community at the time. One of my most satisfying academic experiences is having had the opportunity to co-author a book with him (India's Political system, 2nd edition) just before his untimely death.
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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
“His ability to pick up on body language, to pick up on vocal intonation, to remember what people said and challenge them in nonthreatening ways — he’s a master at it,” says Rose McDermott, a political-science professor at Brown who has watched Bueno de Mesquita conduct interviews. She says she thinks his emotional intelligence, along with his ability to listen, is his true gift, not his mathematical smarts. “The thing is, he doesn’t think that’s his gift,” McDermott says. “He thinks it’s the model. I think the model is, I’m sure, brilliant. But lots of other people are good at math. His gift is in interviewing. I’ve said that flat out to him, and he’s said, ‘Well, anyone can do interviews.’ But they can’t.”
In his 1996 book, “Red Flag Over Hong Kong,” he predicted that the press in Hong Kong “will become largely a tool of the state” — a highly debatable claim today. (In 2006, Reporters Without Borders noted concerns about self-censorship but said that “journalists remain free in Hong Kong.”)
source:
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-t.html
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p.5
The forecasting and policy engineering model I developed assumes that stakeholders on any policy issue care about two things: the outcome on the issue and the extent to which they are seen as instrumental in putting an agreement together (or blocking one). The model specifies a rather simple game and solves the game, in the process estimating how much each stakeholder values the policy outcome relative to being seen as instrumental in shaping the outcome. It also
estimates how each player perceives its relationship with each other player, what proposals players make to each other regarding resolution of the issue (including no proposal at all) on a round by round basis. The model estimates how player positions change and also updates player estimates of the willingness of others to take risks. It does quite a bit more as well. This model depends on expert inputs based on an intensive interview process that elicits who the
stakeholders are who will try to influence an outcome, what outcome they currently argue for, how much persuasive clout they could bring to bear, and how salient the issue is to them compared to other issues on their plate. Experts are not asked how they think the issue will be resolved and the model frequently disagrees with the conventional wisdom on what is likely to happen.
- 2002 book Predicting Politics (ohio state university)
- 1994 book (co-edited with Frans Stokman) European Community Decision Making (yale university press)
- 1997 article in International Interactions for explanations of how the model works.
- Stanley Feder's 2002 article in the Annual Review of Political Science
source: Theory talk #31
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ON GAME THEORY, PREDICTION AND FEAR OF LOGICS IN IR (International Relation)
filename: Theory Talk31_BuenodeMesquita.pdf
http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/06/theory-talk-31.html
(URL link was copy & past from pdf, unverified)
www.theory-talks.org
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p.14
If you look, for instance, at Jim Fearon’s work on rationalist explanations of war, you see that the reason of why wars occur, is not about ethnic, economic or other differences, but it’s rather about three elements, of which you have to have any one to get a war:
(1) uncertainty;
(2) a dispute over something indivisible; or
(3) a commitment problem.
Now this is a very significant contribution, because you can now predict the probability if any one dispute will become violent. Furthermore, as a policy maker, you can then zoom in on these three and eliminate them. Now if theory is about engaging with empirics, about testing explanatory value, then this is not a bad track record. Morgenthau in the preface to the third edition of Politics amongst Nations indicates he was urged to respond to critics of the logics of his theory, but he writes: ‘I will not stoop’. But this is not stooping, this is how science progresses! If your theory doesn’t hold to empirical scrutiny, what is it worth? In my view, realist theory and balance of power theory is affected in its core by the empirical and logical challenges posed. They have been sufficiently refuted, they are false theories, and we should move on. But they don’t move on.
source: Theory talk #31
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ON GAME THEORY, PREDICTION AND FEAR OF LOGICS IN IR (International Relation)
filename: Theory Talk31_BuenodeMesquita.pdf
http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/06/theory-talk-31.html
(URL link was copy & past from pdf, unverified)
www.theory-talks.org
____________________________________
• States, as I see it, do not have interests or preferences or beliefs, people do.
p.1
Among the debates that impinge on understanding I think two are central. One relates to the extent to which our focus might be better placed on individual decision makers and their interests rather than assuming that their interests and the state’s interests are the same. Later in your questions, for instance, you conflate the two, assuming that the welfare of the state is what decision makers are concerned about. This conflation of state and individual interests is, in my view, a fundamental impediment to advancing our understanding of IR. States, as I see it, do not have interests or preferences or beliefs, people do. We may speak of the “national interest” as some aggregation of what most people want or what many people want, or what a few powerful people want, but each of these meanings can produce entirely different expectations about what is in the “national interest.”
source: Theory talk #31
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ON GAME THEORY, PREDICTION AND FEAR OF LOGICS IN IR (International Relation)
filename: Theory Talk31_BuenodeMesquita.pdf
http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/06/theory-talk-31.html
(URL link was copy & past from pdf, unverified)
www.theory-talks.org
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